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How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development in Puntland,
Somalia
Abstract
The international community has united in its mission to halt the hijacking of merchant
ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea with a massive naval presence that monitors the
vast, strategic seas in which Somali pirates operate. This naval presence consequently has
had some success in reducing pirate attacks in 2012, but why are the Somalis turning to
piracy in the first place? The economic history of piracy has been well documented with
other former “pirate hotspots” worldwide; however, there is little data available on the
microeconomic affects of piracy. This article explores the underlying reasons of why
Somalis have turned to piracy as a “profession,” and offers recommendations for the
international community to eliminate piracy effectively through non-military means.
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Introduction
The root causes of why piracy has grown in the Puntland area of Somalia and the rest of the Horn of Africa
is debated, but most agree that piracy stems from the economic hardship of Somalis. When discussing the
exact cause of economic desperation and whether or not it is a valid reason for piracy, many scholars
pinpoint the acceptance of piracy in the Horn of Africa to fishing rights violations. For instance, fishing by
other countries in the territorial waters of Somalia is a serious problem for Puntland. Estimates indicate
that the coastal waters off Puntland have a vast supply of fish that are considered ideal for export causing
many neighboring countries to illegally fish there.1 Veteran African journalist, Peter Eichstaedt, disagrees
with the notion that illegal fishing is a valid reason for why piracy continues to be allowed. Eichstaedt
believes that piracy stems from the self-interests of the pirates and their financiers and not from illegal
fishing. 2
While it is unclear exactly when piracy in Somalia began, testimonies from Somali pirates indicate that
piracy surfaced shortly after the fall of the Somali Government in 1994 when foreign fishing boats sailed
to fish in the Somali waters in the Gulf of Aden. Yemeni fishermen became the largest group of foreigners
to fish illegally off Somalia’s coast. There are claims by former Somali fishermen that Yemenis’ fishing
vessels would dismantle and/or steal Somali fishing nets so that the Yemenis could catch more fish. To
combat this illegal fishing tactic, Somali fishermen would use small boats and basic weapons in order to
force their victims overboard before spraying them with water to retaliate. They would further threaten
other potential ships that would consider entering Somali waters. Some foreign fishermen would be
released without any harm as long as they paid a considerable fine. 3 Thus, it is plausible to assume that
piracy in the region began with Somali fishermen who threatened to attack foreign sailors if they did not
leave their waters. 4 Ultimately, Somali piracy would grow into an international problem when two events
occurred that would significantly alter the living conditions in the country.
In a relatively short period of time, two major events struck Somalia that made the economic situation
worse. First, the number of fish in the Gulf of Aden dropped significantly causing the area to no longer be
economically feasible for Somalis to fish. The waters were simply overfished by both illegal fishing vessels
and Somalis. 5 This dramatically affected the livelihoods of the native population as the inability to catch
and sell fish resulted in local families not being able to purchase food. This led many Somalis to
supplement their wages, but it was nearly impossible for Somali fishermen to find another profession that
would earn a living wage in the war-torn country. 6 An example of testimony recorded by Eichstaedt is of a
pirate named Musi. He became a pirate simply because of poverty and the lack of opportunities in the
Horn of Africa. His mother earned only a couple of dollars a day by selling milk in a local market in
Galkayo. His father, on the other hand, tended camels, cows, and goats - feeding them on the sparse
vegetation found through out the arid windswept inlands. To provide money to purchase necessary

Lewis, Ioan, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008),
104-5.
2 Eichstaedt, Peter, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books,
2010), 182.
3 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 29-30; Sarah Percey and Shortland, Anja,
“The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” German Institute for Economic Research (July 2010): 2, available at:
http://www.brunel.ac.uk/9379/efwps/0942.pdf.
4 Freedom Onuoha, “Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and Gulf of
Aden in Perspective,” African Security Review (July 2010): 37-8, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2009.9627540.
5 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 34; Percey and Shortland, “The Business of
Piracy in Somalia,” 4.
6 Ryan Jablonski and Steven Oliver, “The Political Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and
Modern Piracy,” 2010 American Political Science Conference (October 2010), available at:
http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/pelg/JablonskiOliverThePoliticalEconomyofPlunder10282010RJ.pdf.
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supplies and maintain the house for his family, Musi became a pirate. 7 For many Somali men like Musi,
piracy is the only economic alternative for former fishermen. In addition, the 2004 Tsunami destroyed
much of the necessary equipment for Somalis to fish.
The 2004 Tsunami, representing the second major event, destroyed the lives of millions of people who
resided and visited countries that surround the Indian Ocean. Somalia was struck badly by this event and
subsequently suffered enormous economic hardships. This natural disaster caused the deaths of an
estimated 289 people in Somalia, and the economic damage was much greater than in any other part of
Africa. For instance, the Tsunami destroyed an estimated 800 buildings and over 600 fishing boats. 8
Instantly, the livelihoods of many Somalis were destroyed, and unlike any other affected parts of the
Indian coastline, Somalia received very little foreign aid from the international community. Because of the
lack of a centralized legitimate government in Somali, the United Nations and other organizations have
sent very little aid to Somalia for their reconstruction efforts. 9 Accordingly, many Somalis began to
experience health concerns as a result of illegally-dumped harmful waste that began washing up on the
local shores. 10 These negative health conditions exacerbated the already dire economic situation,
increasing the lure of piracy as a means for survival.
Pastoralists and other Somalis who were affected by the depleted fishing areas off the shores of Somalia
turned to hijacking foreign vessels in a combination of economic desperation and frustration at their
perceived abandonment by the international community. Since the 2004 Tsunami, piracy has quickly
escalated from that of simple hijackings of foreign fishing vessels to the more complex hijackings of cargo
ships and private luxury ships. Formerly unorganized pirates have become sophisticated and well
organized with financiers, mother ships, and financial distribution of ransoms. 11 Its international cost is
estimated between $13 and $16 billion annually, with the real number possibly higher. 12 Undoubtedly,
this number includes the ransoms, the cost of maintaining a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, and the
economic affects of the hijacking of boats. It is estimated that 10 percent of foreign shipping traffic is
refraining from traveling through or near this region, because of the fear of hijacking. 13 In November
2010, the highest ransom, $9.5 million, was paid to release the South Korean oil tanker, Samho Dream
and its sailors. 14 In 2008, estimated ransoms were approximately $50 million, a tenfold increase from
2007. Most importantly, the number has increased considerably ever since. 15 The most famous hijacked
ship is the U.S. freight vessel Maersk Alabama that was captured on April 8, 2009, and held by pirates for
a $10 million ransom. Four days later, U.S. Navy Seals fatally shot three hijackers and subsequently
rescued the hostages. 16 The only hijacker who survived the sniper attack was Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse
Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 22; Raymond Gilpin, “Counting the costs of
Somali Piracy,” United Nations Institute of Peace (June 2009): 6, available at:
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.pdf.
8 Martin Plaut, “Tsunami: Somalia’s slow recovery,” BBC News, December 26, 2005, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4560246.stm.
9 Plaut, “Tsunami: Somalia’s slow recovery;” “US provides 1 million dollars to help tsunami-hit Somalia,”
Xinhua via COMTEX, February 7, 2005, available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/us-provides1-million-dollars-help-tsunami-hit-somalia
10 Najad Abdullahj, “Toxic Waste behind Somali piracy,” Al Jazeera, October 11, 2008, available at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218 644.html; Eichstaedt, Pirate
State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 33, 37-9.
11 Peter, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 53; Perceyand Shortland, “The Business of
Piracy in Somalia,” 4.
12 Onuoha, “Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and Gulf of Aden in
Perspective, 38.
13 Anna Bowden, “The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy, 13” One Earth Future Foundation, December
2010, available at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/documents_old/The_Economic
Cost_of_Piracy_Full_Report.pdf.
14 Bowden, “The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy,” 9.
15 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 55.
16 Robert McFadden, and Scott Shane. "In Rescue of Captain, Navy Kills 3 Privates." New York Times,
April 12, 2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/world/africa/13pirates.html.
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who was onboard the U.S.S. Bainbridge conducting negotiations and was later convicted of piracy. 17 The
Maersk Alabama was not the only major ship recued from Somalia, but it has become a symbol of the
determination of the international community to respond to Somali piracy.

The Microeconomic Effects of Piracy Operations
To effectively combat piracy in the Horn of Africa, the international community needs to examine the
economic reasons and affects of why Somalis turn to piracy. The “organization of piracy” includes more
than just pirates as it encompasses financiers who give the start up financial capital for the pirates to
purchase their supplies, such as boats, GPS devices, food, and fuel. After a successful hijacking, ships are
often brought to Somali coastal cities where its residents sell goods to the pirates, stimulating the
economies of the cities. This unusual circle brings an interesting question on whether inflation and other
economic factors are affecting the region as a whole.
When a group of Somalis examine their economic options and are forced to become pirates because of the
lack of opportunities elsewhere, they usually do not have the necessary start-up financial capital needed
for the occupation. Hence, they go to financial sponsors - usually local businessman - who give the new
Somali pirates the needed funds to purchase the necessary items to successfully hijack a vessel. 18 In return
for their investment, financiers generally receive 30 percent of the ransom money. 19 However, some
estimates suggest that 50 percent of the ransom money actually goes to the financiers. 20 More
importantly, the start-up money from local businessmen comes from two sources. The first source is
through the informal banking system in Somalia through deposits from Somalis living abroad. 21 In fact,
the Diaspora has been able to support the flow of money to the region, between the amounts of $500
million to $1 billion dollars a year to their relatives who are still living in Somalia, Somaliland, and
Puntland. 22 This money has been used via loans from local businessmen to give the necessary start-up
financial capital to the pirates. The second source is the increase in the way local businessmen are
receiving the necessary funds from abroad: Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and terrorist organizations. As a
result, foreign businessmen are giving local Somali financiers the necessary start-up cash. 23 And it is usual
for the financier to invest in the skiff and motor of the boat, the weapons and ammunitions needed for the
hijacking, the tools to get onto the hijacked vessel, and the technology (a GPS device) for the pirates to
know their location, and of which Somali coastal city they will bring the hijacked boat. The total cost of the
financier’s investment comes to an estimated $21,200. 24 Once the funds are collected, they are given to a
new pirates’ operation in the hope that they can return the start-up capital as well as produce a profit for
them.
After the new pirates receive the start-up cash from their financer, they then need to purchase the
necessary goods for hijacking maritime vessels. The estimated cost for the pirates range from whether or
not the pirates are experienced, have set up accounts with their pirate networks, and to where they bring
the hijacked vessels. The average operational cost for the pirates is close to $300,000. 25 This includes the
Joe Kishore, “Obama Administration ends Somali Pirate Standoff with Lethal Force,” World Socialist
Website, April 13, 2009, available at: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/apr2009/soma-a13.shtml;
Benjamin Weiser, “Pirate suspect charged as adult in New York,” New York Times, April 21, 2009,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/22/nyregion/22pirate.html?_r=2.
18 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 30; Anja Shortland, “Robin Hook: The
Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” Economics of Security Working Paper Series (September 2011):
4-7, available at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.379394.de/dp1155.pdf.
19 Jablonskiand Oliver, “The Political Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and Modern Piracy,” 8.
20 Shortland, “Robin Hook: The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 6.
21 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 146.
22 Bradbury, Mark, Becoming Somaliland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 148; Shire,
Saad, “Transactions with Homeland: Remittance,” Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somalia
Studies 4:10 (2004): 102.
23 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 47; Shortland, “Robin Hook: The
Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 4-7.
24 Gilpin, “Counting the costs of Somali Piracy,” 10.
25 Ibid, 6-7; Percey and Shortland, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” 4.
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cost of food, supplies, equipment maintenance, care of hijack victims, and methods to collect the
ransoms. 26 The hope is that the ransom will be able to cover these start-up costs and have enough left over
for their personal expenses. It is worth noting that the first man who boards the hijacked ship receives a
bonus of usually $5,000. The idea behind this stems from the fact that the pirate who first initiates close
contact with the soon-to-be hostages has the most risk, for the ship passengers might try to attack and
harm him before he is supported by the other pirates who begin to board the vessel. 27 Once the ship is
under the control of the pirates, they then have to sail the ship ashore, and a new set of economic
transactions occur while they wait for their ransoms.
After hijacking a ship, the pirates usually take the vessel to a coastal city in Puntland, where they can
monitor and negotiate with the company that owns the hijacked vessel. 28 The best-known locations are
Eyl, Garad, Hoboyo, Hardheere, Mogadishu, and Bosasso. 29 Once at port, the pirates are responsible to
pay the community a fee for the docking of the ship at the city’s port. This fee is approximately 10 percent
of the profit of the expected ransom. 30 Once the ship is on the coast and the docking fee is paid, the
hijackers will then hire a negotiator so that he can give their demands for the hijacked vessel to its owners.
When at dock, local merchants will sell food and supplies that are necessary to keep the hostages alive.
Items that are often purchased by pirates are: sheep, goats, water, rice, fuel, pasta, and milk. Similar to a
tourist area in any country, the prices for basic goods jump in price. The notable examples are: $25 for a
pack of cigarettes; $10 for a can of Coca-Cola soda; and $250 for a goat. 31 The money that the pirates are
using to pay for these expenses comes out of their total revenue and not from the financiers or sponsors. If
the negotiations drag on, their total revenue from the hijacking could disappear.
A basic economic question involves whether or not there is a possibility of inflation arising from these
transactions between the pirates and the local ports. With the dramatic increase of prices of goods,
inflation does affect the value of goods and services for the coastal cities, but not for the region as a whole.
The reason is that inflation stems from a different source in the Horn of Africa than is commonly
understood by economists. The increase in prices and of money supply to the cities does not cause the
price increase. The source behind the increases of prices of food, security, bribes, etc., stems from ships
not wanting to dock and unload their cargo in Somalia because of the fear that they will be hijacked. 32
Thus, the aggregate demand of Somalis in the Horn of Africa has not changed, but the aggregate supply
has dramatically decreased. Even though there is artificial inflation by merchants in the pirate cities, the
overall Somali economy is hurting from the decline in aggregate supply of goods from around the world.

The Microeconomic Affects of Post-hijacking in Puntland
How the ransom is used can tell the international community as much about the situation as can the
conditions of why Somalis choose to become pirates. When discussing the distribution of the ransoms,
three main actors surface. The first are pirates who spend their money for goods, products, and
repayment of debts. The second are the financer(s) who use their part of the ransom for reinvestment for
future pirate missions and for their personal interest. The third involves the clan leaders, warlords, and
the Puntland Government who all use the funds for various reasons - personal wealth, investments in the
community. Overall, these actors are the most important to understand how piracy continues, even when
foreign governments send their naval fleets to stop Somali pirates.

Gilpin, “Counting the costs of Somali Piracy,” 10.
Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 24.
28 Ibid., 57-60.
29 Ibid., 36; Gilpin, Raymond, “Counting the costs of Somali Piracy,” United Nations Institute of Peace,
June 2009, available at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.pdf, 7.
30 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 57; Jablonskiand Oliver, “The Political
Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and Modern Piracy,” 8; Shortland, “Robin Hook: The
Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,”, 6.
31 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 36, 62.
32 Bowden, “The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy,” 22-3.
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27

50
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss1/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.1.4

Beloff: How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development in Puntland, Somalia

As noted earlier, Somali pirates turn toward this illegal trade because of a lack of any other real economic
opportunities. Estimates of the exact number of Somali pirates range around the 5,000 mark. 33 Data
suggests that most pirates spend their share of the ransom money on two items. The first is the repayment
of debts. Previous purchases of homes, cars, and supplies needed for the hijackings force many Somalis to
take on loans. An example is from the testimony of a pirate named Khalil who used ransom money to
repay debts that he and his family collected over the last few years. 34 After repayment of previous debts,
Somali pirates often spend the rest of the money purchasing items for their consumption such as luxury
cars, new houses, electronics, and other western gadgets. This brings into question whether Somalis
becoming pirates is based from the need to afford necessary items for survival. Eichstaedt’s research
suggests that their purchasing patterns are not rational and are only based on simple desires. 35 With these
new properties and gadgets, the demand increases to purchase new weapons or hiring security forces to
protect their property. The pirate’s and financier’s purchasing of new houses has created a housing bubble
with the demand of housing rising faster than the supply of housing. 36 Outside of the actual act of piracy,
the economic lives of Somali pirates seem to be better than the Somalis who are not pirates based from a
consumption basis. However, there is very little available information on whether they save any of the
profits that they make, or if they invest it in any programs.
The ransom money that pirate’s financiers receive is utilized for three purposes. The first is for the
reinvestment for future pirate missions. The money is spent for either new equipment for their existing
pirates so they can hijack more ships in shorter periods of time, or it is used for the sponsoring of new
pirates. 37 Similar to the pirates themselves, the financiers also purchase new homes, cars, security forces,
etc., based purely on personal wants. 38 The investors also use their share of the ransoms to invest in other
businesses around the world. 39 What seems to be a major part of the ransom goes into the bribing of
warlords, clan leaders, and Puntland Government officials.
It is still very much of a mystery of exactly how much warlords and clan leaders receive from the ransoms
of hijacked ships. It is clear that they do participate in the piracy trade to some extent. Clan leaders in the
coastal cities request a payment of $100,000, which is spent on the development of the community. In
Bosasso, there is photographic evidence depicting clan leaders and warlords using some of the pirate
ransom money for the construction of schools and mosques. 40 Some Somali clan leaders have instructed
that if a pirate is captured, he must not “talk.” This stems from the fear that Somali clan leaders have
information that the captured pirates might disclose the networks and relationships between the pirates,
financiers, and the clan leaders. 41 The Puntland Government has been known to receive funds in the form
of bribes from clan leaders, warlords, and the financiers so that they do not stop or prosecute Somali
pirates. It is estimated that 30% of the ransom money that goes to clan leaders and financiers who lobby
and bribe the political leaders of Puntland to ignore the International Communities’ complaints about the
piracy trade. 42 In return for these funds, not only are the pirates protected, they are also given
information that will aid them in future hijackings such as giving information of the location of foreign
ships. 43 This has caused outrage by the international community; however, Puntland is not a recognized
state, so it does not have to obey international maritime laws. 44 Many Puntland officials are even scared to
cross paths with the pirate businesses in fear of assassination. In fact, a Puntland judge who handed out
Shortland, “Robin Hook: The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 5.
Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 75; Shortland, “Robin Hook: The
Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 8.
35 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 72-3; Shortland, “Robin Hook: The
Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 3-4, 8, 25.
36 Gilpin, “Counting the costs of Somali Piracy,” 11.
37 Ibid., 8; Jablonski and Oliver, “ 8.
38 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 64-6; Shortland, “Robin Hook; The
Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 22, 32-5.
39 Shortland, “Robin Hook: The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 8..
40 Ibid., 24, 32-5.
41 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea 28.
42 Ibid., 62-3, 177-8; Murphy, “Somali Piracy: Not Just a Naval Problem,” 1-2.
43 Gilpin, “Counting the costs of Somali Piracy,” 10.
44 Shortland, “Robin Hook; The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 20.
33
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jail terms to captured Somali pirates was mysteriously killed for the sentencing. 45 There has also been
some speculation that high members of the Puntland Government are personally involved in the piracy
business. 46 The interest of clan leaders, warlords, and the Puntland Government is to keep, continue, and
build the business of piracy.
Overall, the answer to the question of whether piracy has aided in the development of Puntland is
disappointing. The communities themselves do not see a real increase in their economic development,
based from real wages. Food prices have risen in towns predominantly used by pirates, and the local’s
wages have decreased. The people who are solely benefiting economically are the pirates might be better
(excluding the actual hijacking of the ships), and the lives of the financiers, clan leaders, warlords, and the
bribed Puntland Government workers. However, their benefits do not trickle down to the average Somali
in Puntland who is greatly suffering from the piracy trade. 47 The question then becomes how to stop
piracy by either making it economically unattractive or by incorporating military policies to counter the
illegal activities.

Possible Solutions to Reduce Piracy
How does the international community stop piracy? There seems to be two main theories on how it can be
solved. The first is what is currently being implemented, a military operation to stop or contain pirate
attacks. The second option is to economically develop all of Somalia to stop the preliminary reasons of
why Somalis turn to piracy. However, both arguments presented here are simplified versions of what
could be done to stop Somali piracy.
The international community has put forth United Nations (UN) resolutions, funds, and the sending of
naval forces to halt Somali piracy. The theory that stems from these policies is that the only way to show
Somali pirates that they cannot commit acts of piracy is to punish those who are caught in the courts in
Kenya or in other parts of the World. 48 What seems to be the current strategy of the international
community is “to engage” the pirates with force once they have hijacked a ship - very similar to the
Maersk Alabama incident in 2009. In fact, this has been approved by UN Resolution 1816 that gives
permission to international naval fleets to engage Somali pirates. Although this resolution would later be
repealed, a similar resolution was agreed upon shortly afterwards allowing the monitoring of the Gulf of
Aden by international naval vessels and the establishment of judicial courts to prosecute any suspected
captured pirates. 49 Having a military presence in the Gulf of Aden, however, has cost foreign nations a
total of $1.3 to $2.0 billion per year. 50 Additionally, there has been minor land forces used to attack,
arrest, and/or kill pirates and their leaders. Specifically, American troops target suspected pirates and are
transported via helicopter to the region to either arrest or kill the suspected pirates. 51 It must be noted
that these policies are neither to stop hijacking for the long term in the Gulf nor to improve the conditions
of Somalia, which breeds the piracy. 52 They are there as either a response or a very short-term prevention
of pirate attacks. This has led some to believe that the only way to cease piracy is to eliminate the causes of
it through economic development.

Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 167.
“Counting the costs of Somali Piracy,” 3-4.
47 Shortland, “Robin Hook; The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy,” 9.
48 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 105-119, 160-2; Murphy, “Somali Piracy:
Not Just a Naval Problem,” 1-4; Percey and Shortland, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” 34.
49 Bowden, “The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy,” 20; Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s
Terrorism at Sea, 54; Onuoha, “Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast
and Gulf of Aden in Perspective, 39-40.
50 Bowden, “The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy,” 15.
51 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s Terrorism at Sea, 49-52; Onuoha, “Sea Piracy and Maritime
Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and Gulf of Aden in Perspective, 41; Percey and
Shortland, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” 11.
52 Eichstaedt, Pirate State: Inside Somalia’s terrorism at sea, 173-84; Murphy, “Somali Piracy: Not Just a
Naval Problem,” 1-4.
45
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It would seem hard to image that Somalia could have a bright future waiting for the country, however,
after examining the economic structure of Somalia, we see that this nation’s economy has operated
without a central bank or an effective government for nearly two decades. In nearly all-economic theories,
there needs to be at least some type of government to protect private property. 53 In Somalia, they have
been able to sidestep this belief. If proper free market capitalism is implemented to the fullest (such as the
example of telecommunications in Somalia), then it is possible to strengthen the current government
based from their economy. 54 The areas in which Somalia can rebuild its state is with the help from the
world markets that will allow the country to utilize its potential oil reserves, tourism, strategic ports in
Berbera, Somaliland and Bossasso, and the traditional livestock trade. A historical problem with Somalia
has been their leadership, whereas, the lists of potential leaders from the different clans in Somalia and
Puntland are not impressive. However, the Somalis who have emigrated from Somalia to live in the West
are more impressive. For instance, the notable Somali scholar Ahmed I. Samatar and many others are
involved in the fields of art, academia, and music to name some areas. They can be considered the leaders
of Somalia because they have witnessed efficient leadership from living in the West. Most importantly,
they have committed their support for their homelands with the contribution of monetary donations in
the amounts of $500 million to $1 billion dollars per year to relatives still in Somalia, Somaliland, and
Puntland. 55 Ultimately, success can be achieved if free market capitalism is allowed to take hold in
Somalia with the leadership of the current Diaspora.
To stop the cycle of piracy in the Horn of Africa, there are two main options that can be implemented. The
first is the current strategy of the international community to use a multinational naval force in the Gulf of
Aden to stop hijacks once they have begun, free the hijacked vessels, and helicopter operations to try to
stop pirates before they attempt to hijack a vessel. In no way is it being suggested that the service of these
naval fleets are being condemned or denoted, but it seems impractical to continue this short-term
strategy. The other option to stop piracy is for the focus to be on economic development of the region. If
attained, Somalis who have the ability to earn a living wage will likely abandon piracy. 56 The problem with
development is that it takes time and resources. It seems that the international community has decided
that it is more economical for them to just deal with the piracy in either paying the ransoms or attacking
with their militaries.

Conclusion
Most of the international community abandoned Somalia after the horrific events of the downing of the
American Blackhawk helicopters during the end of the Battle of Mogadishu and after the complete failure
of several attempts to establish any type of government in Somalia. This has led to desperation by many
Somalis. With no effective government able to protect their coastal waters, foreign fishing fleets have
overfished the coastal waters to a point that fishing is no longer economical. This was compounded by the
tragic 2004 Tsunami that destroyed hundreds of fishing boats and destroyed many parts of Puntland and
the rest of Somalia.
Piracy originated in Somalis by giving fines or harassing foreign fishing fleets, but as the situation
worsened in Somalia, the targets became the freight ships that carried the products from around the
World into the global market. Piracy became more organized by Somali pirates receiving start-up
financial capital from financiers. These financiers not only gave the start-up funds necessary for piracy but
also much of the necessary equipment for the pirates. Once a ship was successfully hijacked, the ship was
brought back to port where the coastal city would sell the overpriced items such as food and fuel to the
pirates. The hijackers are forced to purchase their supplies from these merchants because they need to
keep their hostages alive and wait until their broker sends the ransom demands to whoever owns the
hijacked vessel. Once the ransom is paid, the pirates, financiers, and other parties (the clan leaders and
warlords as well as the Puntland Government) distribute it between themselves. Tragically, this economic
system is sustaining the piracy in the region, but this is the only option for many Somalis.
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The international community has decided that it is more economical to handle the “pirate problem” one
hijacking at a time. This short term planning has not stopped the root of Somali piracy and poverty. As
long as Puntland and the rest of Somalia remains poor, underdeveloped, and without a functioning
government, piracy will be a viable option for Somalis. If the international community wants to terminate
the causes for the necessity of piracy by Somalis, its leaders need to understand the economic affects and
implement policies that can terminate piracy for the long haul.
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